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Abstract
Banking system crises are complex events that in a short span of time can inflict
extensive damage to banks themselves and to the external economy. The crisis liter-
ature has so far identified a number of distinct effects or channels that can propagate
distress contagiously both directly within the banking network itself and indirectly,
between the network and the external economy. These contagious effects, and the
potential events that trigger these effects, can explain most aspects of past crises,
and are thought to be likely to dominate future financial crises. Since the current
international financial regulatory regime based on the Basel III Accord does a good
job of ensuring that banks are resilient to such contagion effects taken one at a time,
systemic risk theorists increasingly understand that future crises are likely to be dom-
inated by the spillovers between distinct contagion channels. The present paper aims
to provide a model for systemic risk that is comprehensive enough to include the
important contagion channels identified in the literature. In such a model one can
hope to understand the dangerous spillover effects that are expected to dominate
future crises. To rein in the number and complexity of the modelling assumptions,
two requirements are imposed, neither of which is yet well-known or established in
the main stream of systemic risk research. The first, called stock-flow consistency,
demands that the financial system follows a rigorous set of rules based on account-
ing principles. The second requirement, called Asset-Liability symmetry, implies that
every proposed contagion channel has a dual channel obtained by interchanging as-
sets and liabilities, and that these dual channel pairs have a symmetric mathematical
representation.
Key words: Systemic risk, banking network, stock flow consistency, asset liability
symmetry, cascade, interbank exposure, funding liquidity, insolvency, indirect conta-
gion, asset fire sales, bank panics.
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1 Introduction
Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis” [Minsky, 1982] captures the idea
that of all economic sectors, the financial sector is most prone to systemic risk. As
[Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011] has investigated, prolonged periods of financial stabil-
ity create the conditions, including greed and avarice, for the “Minsky moment” when
financial instability suddenly appears. There is broad agreement [Kaufman and Scott,
2003, Taylor, 2010] that a Minsky moment, or financial crisis, must involve at least
three attributes: (i) a triggering event, which may be narrow (affecting one bank), or
broad (affecting many banks or a whole market); (ii) the propagation of shocks within
the financial system; (iii) severe impact on the macroeconomy. Major financial crises
of the past typically exhibit all of the following effects: wide-scale loss of confidence,
bank panics, market crashes, a credit crunch and asset fire sales.
Systemic risk literature reviewed in [Kaufman, 1994, de Bandt and Hartmann,
2000, De Bandt et al., 2010, Galati and Moessner, 2013] describes and develops the
theoretical and empirical basis for a rich variety of “channels” or mechanisms that are
important drivers of financial crises of the past. These studies view the system as an
interconnected network of financial institutions (“banks”) that have stylized balance
sheets such as the one shown in Table 1. The studies reveal at least four fundamentally
distinct channels for the propagation and amplification of shocks within the financial
system and to the macroeconomy: (i) solvency contagion, caused by banks with weak
equity; (ii) funding liquidity contagion, caused by banks with weak cash positions;
(iii) asset fire sales; and (iv) bank runs and panics. A fully developed banking crisis
can be expected to exhibit feedback and spillover effects between all four of these
channels.
Assets Liabilities
interbank assets Z¯ interbank debt X¯
external fixed assets A¯ external debt D¯
external liquid assets C¯ equity E¯
Table 1: A stylized bank balance sheet.
Systemic risk models predating the 2007-08 financial crisis focus on solvency or
default contagion, as reviewed in [Upper, 2011]. Such models focus on the build up of
shocks to creditor banks when one or more banks default: the review concludes that
none of the 15 models studied was able to anticipate the imminent financial crisis of
2007-08. Funding liquidity contagion refers to the shocks on debtor banks that follow
when their creditor banks withdraw short term funding. As studied by [Brunnermeier
and Pedersen, 2009, Gai et al., 2011], this channel leads directly to credit freezes and
liquidity hoarding. The third channel, called asset fire sales or market illiquidity, was
studied for example in [Shleifer and Vishny, 1992, Cifuentes et al., 2005, Greenwood
et al., 2015]. Large scale market effects arise when distressed banks shrink their
balance sheets by selling illiquid assets. The resultant asset price impact creates
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mark-to-market losses to other banks holding overlapping asset portfolios, leading to
contagious amplification of the crisis. Fourthly, bank runs and panics, studied for
example in [Calomiris and Gorton, 1991, Rochet and Vives, 2004], occur when banks’
depositors and wholesale funders decide to withdraw funds or equivalently, fail to roll
over funding.
In this list of four important channels of contagion, one should distinguish the
so-called “direct” contagion channels (i) and (ii), where shocks are transmitted within
the financial system, from the “indirect” contagion of (iii) and (iv) which both involve
feedback between the financial system and the macroeconomy (i.e. the exterior of the
system). The indirect contagion channels (iii) and (iv) can also be interpreted as the
drivers of the so-called “financial accelerator” reviewed in [Bernanke et al., 1999] that
links the distress in the financial system to shocks in the macroeconomy.
A number of recent papers build on earlier systemic risk literature by exploring the
various linkages and spillovers between these contagion channels. Their overall aim is
to show that important crisis amplification effects emerge from these linkages that can-
not be understood when restricting attention only one or two channels. [Bookstaber
et al., 2014] introduces an agent-based model for analyzing the vulnerability of the
financial system to asset- and funding-based fire sales. A recent paper [Aldasoro and
Faia, 2016] provides a framework that combines the two indirect contagion channels
within a financial network model. [Cont and Schaanning, 2017] presents a framework
for quantifying the impact of fire sales in a network of financial institutions holding
common assets and subject to leverage or capital constraints. The book [Gatti et al.,
2011] and references therein provide a general agent-based modelling framework for
macroeconomics. Hüser et al. [2017] present a multi-layered network model to assess
the systemic implications of adopting bail-in bank resolution among the largest euro
area banking groups.
The present paper will augment this recent stream of literature by introducing a
sequence of extended models of systemic risk based on the framework provided by
[Eisenberg and Noe, 2001]. The last and most complete of these new models unifies
all four of the above contagion channels and the potential spillovers between them.
Our primary purpose is illustrative, and therefore we strive in each model for the
simplest possible explanation for each channel, and consider only the most direct
linkages between channels. Despite its known deficiencies as a picture of systemic
risk, the Eisenberg-Noe 2001 model is simple and well-studied. For this reason we
adopt it as the conceptual basis for our new framework, and like that model, treat
the financial system as a network of interbank linkages between N banks, coupled
to the macroeconomy (system exterior). The banks follow deterministic behavioural
rules of the type developed in the systemic risk literature reviewed in [Upper, 2011].
This places our framework close to the literature on agent-based models in economics
[Farmer and Foley, 2009]. The triggering event at the onset of the financial crisis
being modelled will put the system in a severely stressed state with some banks either
insolvent or illiquid. Thereafter, the contagion dynamics proceeds stepwise in time
until eventually an equilibrium is approached that represents the end of the crisis. The
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following requirements underlie all the models proposed in this paper. They are made
for specificity and to rein in complexity, but can be replaced later by more complex,
realistic assumptions.
A1 The time step is one day. Prior to the triggering event on day n = 0, all banks
are in their normal, solvent and liquid state. The triggering event causes some
banks to become either insolvent or illiquid.
A2 Bank balance sheets have the structure shown in Table 1 and are recomputed
daily on a mark-to-market, stock-flow consistent basis.
A3 Interest payments and dividends are neglected during the crisis.
A4 The dynamics of balance sheets exhibit a formal symmetry between assets and
liabilities.
The stock-flow consistency assumption A2 requires the balance sheet dynamics
to be decomposable into a sequence of elementary steps which incorporate so-called
quadruple entry accounting as described in the book [Godley and Lavoie, 2012]. This
imposes a system-wide logical structure to the valuation of assets and liabilities. It
ensures that anyone can verify that the proposed model dynamics, no matter how
complex, avoids any basic economic pitfall. In subsequent discussions, we will find it
helpful to propose the existence of an imaginary system regulator or auditor that forces
all banks to follow stock-flow consistent rules based on market-to-market valuation of
balance sheet entries.
The proposed asset-liability (AL) symmetry invoked in A4 extends the natural
left-right symmetry shown in Table 1 to the level of the dynamical changes of the sys-
tem. Thus, for example, the sale of $1 worth of fixed asset leads to the balance sheet
adjustments: ∆A¯ = −1,∆C¯ = 1,∆D¯ = ∆E¯ = 0. This is AL symmetric to a mark-
to-market drop in the value of the external debt: ∆D¯ = −1,∆E¯ = 1,∆A¯ = ∆C¯ = 0.
Invoking AL symmetry exemplifies the Principle of Occam’s Razor, the criterion that
values explanations when they are based on the fewest (or simplest) possible modelling
assumptions. Asking for AL symmetry in systemic risk models is motivated by an ob-
servation made by [Hurd, 2016] and others that existing models of solvency contagion
are formally symmetric to models of funding liquidity contagion under the interchange
of debtor and creditor relationships. While current and prospective accounting princi-
ples do not treat assets and liabilities symmetrically, nonetheless, commentary on the
IFRS new accounting regulatory measures being implemented by the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) suggests that future revisions will move in the
direction of making financial regulation and definitions more exactly symmetric be-
tween assets and liabilities1. Since AL symmetry is strong at the level of financial
1From an IASB website
www.iasplus.com/en/meeting-notes/iasb/2013/iasb-february-2013/cf-recognition-derecognition
“... Some Board members were concerned with the drafting of the language specifically that it was very
definite that an asset would always exist for one party where another has a liability. Board members were
in tentative agreement over the requirement for symmetry in the DP (discussion paper) but it was still
unclear as to whether there would be absolute symmetry (and how symmetry would affect the Framework)
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securities, it is appropriate to explore the implications of a weak type of AL symme-
try to simplify the development of unified solvency and liquidity cascade models. We
emphasize that this symmetry is “weak” in the sense that while the structure of the
dynamical equations is AL symmetric, the actual parameter values are not symmetric.
Taking this abstract AL symmetry seriously leads to certain insights. For example,
it may seem surprising that “equity”, defined as assets minus debt, is a liability that
can be seen as the dual concept to “cash”.
The problem of solvency cascades in interbank networks has been studied for over
two decades. The Eisenberg-Noe 2001 model stands at the centre of such research as
the fundamental characterization of solvency cascades in a network of “banks” with
stylized balance sheets. Subsequent research into solvency cascades, notably works
by [Elsinger et al., 2006a,b, Nier et al., 2007], and most of the studies reviewed in
[Upper, 2011] reference this model. A more recent paper, [Gai and Kapadia, 2010],
offers an even simpler model of solvency cascades that ties this subject into the general
theory of information cascades on random networks stemming from the famous model
of [Watts, 2002].
More recently, the problem of funding illiquidity has been recognized and studied
as an additional channel for contagion in financial networks. A model introduced
in [Gai et al., 2011] provides us with a picture that banks, when hit by an external
shock to their liabilities, such as a large withdrawal from a depositor, may experience
“stress”, or an insufficiency in liquid assets. Such a bank is then assumed to react by
“hoarding” liquidity, that is recalling short term loans from debtors, including other
banks. This creates the mechanism for liquidity contagion: recalling interbank loans
transmits liquidity shocks to debtor banks. Interestingly, the mathematical equations
for the funding liquidity cascade models of GHK 2011 and [Lee, 2013] are identical
to variations of the EN solvency cascade model, but with the direction of shocks
reversed. This is a basic consequence of AL symmetry in systemic risk. A brief review
of these two models and their generalizations, touching on their analogy to the EN
2001 model, can be found in Section 2.2 of [Hurd, 2016].
The present paper achieves four main results:
1. Theorem 2 proves that the EN 2001 model has an equivalent solvency cascade
formulation satisfying A1, A2 and A3 of the four modelling requirements. A
natural interpretation of the EN 2001 cascade invokes a system regulator that
provides an orderly resolution of insolvent banks through a bail-in mechanism
applied iteratively.
2. The generalized liquidity (GL) cascade model is introduced and shown to be
dual to the EN model under the AL symmetry, and therefore it also satisfies
A1, A2 and A3. The interpretation is that the system regulator functions as the
“lender of last resort” (LLR) to resolve illiquid banks by providing overdrafts
with strict repayment rules.
3. The above solvency and liquidity cascade models are unified symmetrically and
and whether if a liability exists for one party, an asset will always exist for the other party.”
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unambiguously as a complete model of direct contagion, called the Solvency and
Liquidity cascade model (SL cascade model). This unification now satisfies all
of assumptions A1 to A4. Theorem 3 provides conditions that imply the state
of the system must converge monotonically to a cascade equilibrium.
4. The channels of indirect contagion, asset fire sales and bank runs and panics,
are integrated with the SL contagion model, yielding the Extended Solvency and
Liquidity cascade model (ESL cascade model) that unifies in a symmetric way
the four most important contagion channels discussed in the literature. Figure
1 provides a schematic representation of this model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we review the EN
solvency cascade model, extended to allow external debt to be greater than external
assets, and prove Theorem 2 which shows that the model has a stock-flow consistent
representation. In this formulation of the EN model, there are two levels of bank
insolvency. “Partial insolvency” is when a bank is able to repay external depositors
in full, but only able to partially repay their interbank debt. “Full insolvency” is
when the bank is unable to repay any interbank debt. Next, the GL cascade model
is defined and shown to be an exact dual of the EN model, with cash assets behaving
as the dual counterpart to equity. In this model, a bank that has overdrawn its
cash asset is called “partly illiquid” if it can realize sufficient cash by recalling their
interbank loans, and “fully illiquid” if it needs to also liquidate fixed assets to fulfil
its cash obligations. In Section 3, we formulate and interpret the SL cascade model,
a stock-flow consistent model that unifies the solvency and liquidity cascades from
Section 2. The two channels of indirect contagion, asset fire sales and bank panics,
are then integrated with the SL cascade model in Section 4, leading to the Extended
SL (ESL) cascade model. The concluding Section 5 offers some points of view on
further questions about systemic risk that are amenable to study within the network
framework developed in this paper.
2 Financial Network Cascade Models
This section will review systemic risk models that view a crisis as a contagious cas-
cade on a network of N “banks”, labelled by i = 1, 2, . . . , N (which may include
non-regulated leveraged financial institutions such as hedge funds, or other regulated
financial institutions such as insurance companies). These institutions are linked by a
collection of exposures such as interbank loans or derivative exposures. Table 1 shows
a schematic characterization of their balance sheets.
Prior to the onset of the crisis, a bank’s balance sheet B¯ = [Z¯, A¯, C¯, X¯, D¯, E¯] (la-
belled by barred quantities) consists of nominal values of assets and liabilities, which
correspond to the aggregated values of the contracts, valued as if all banks are solvent.
Nominal values can also be considered book values or face values. Assets (loans) and
liabilities (debts) are decomposed into interbank and external quantities depending
on whether the counterparty is a bank or not. Banks and institutions that are not
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part of the system under analysis are deemed to be part of the exterior, and their ex-
posures are included as part of the external debts and assets. Finally, two categories
of external assets are included. Fixed assets model the retail loan book and realize
only a fraction of their value if liquidated prematurely while liquid assets includes
government treasury bills and the like that are assumed to be as liquid as cash.
Definition 1. The nominal value of assets of bank i prior to the crisis consists of the
nominal interbank assets Z¯i, the nominal external fixed assets A¯i, and the nominal
external liquid assets C¯i. The nominal value of liabilities of the bank consists of
the nominal interbank debt X¯i, the nominal external debt D¯i and the bank’s nominal
equity E¯i. The nominal exposure of bank j to bank i is denoted by Ω¯ij. All components
of B¯ and Ω¯ are non-negative, and the accounting identities are satisfied:
Z¯i =
∑
j
Ω¯ji, X¯i =
∑
j
Ω¯ij ,
∑
i
Z¯i =
∑
i
X¯i, Ω¯ii = 0 ,
Z¯i + A¯i + C¯i = X¯i + D¯i + E¯i . (1)
As discussed in detail in Chapter 2 of the book [Godley and Lavoie, 2012], stock-
flow consistent modelling requires using actual or mark-to-market values during the
cascade, as balance sheets move away from their nominal values. We will denote
these mark-to-market values by symbols B = [Z,A,C,X,D,E] and Ω without upper
bars. Equity E represents the total firm value held by shareholders. One school of
thought defines equity as the market capitalization of the firm, and an additional
balance sheet entry called net worth is needed to enforce the balancing of assets and
liabilities. Instead, we define E so that the accounting identity (1) holds for both
nominal values and actual values at all times. Equivalently, we assume the net worth
is zero at all times. Equity can be regarded as a buffer that, while positive, absorbs
market shocks. Economic cascade models invoke the notion of limited liability, and
define a firm to be defaulted or insolvent (for us, these two terms mean the same) when
its equity is non-positive. By the accounting identity, this means its aggregated assets
are insufficient to pay the aggregated debt, and such a bank is assumed to be unable
continue to operate as a going concern. In a somewhat analogous way, liquid assets
C are kept available to pay deposit withdrawals on demand. We define a bank to be
illiquid when C is non-positive: such a bank may have difficulties in raising enough
cash to become compliant with the accounting constraints.
Definition 2. 1. A defaulted bank or insolvent bank is a bank with E ≤ 0. A
solvent bank is a bank with E > 0.
2. An illiquid bank is a bank with C ≤ 0. A liquid bank is a bank with C > 0.
3. A bank that is either illiquid or insolvent is called impaired.
A bank whose equity is dangerously low, or negative, has few strategies available
to restore financial health. Raising additional equity through the issue of new shares
dilutes existing shareholders, because prospective buyers are aware that their invest-
ment is adding value to the bank’s debt. The alternative of restructuring debt through
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negotiation also sends a very unsavory signal to the market. The most likely response
of such a weak bank will be to sell some assets to reduce its leverage. Similarly, a
bank whose liquid assets have been depleted through a run of deposit withdrawals
will be challenged to find new depositors elsewhere and will lose equity if illiquid as-
sets are sold at a loss. Because such stressed banks have limited options available,
it is reasonable to create models in which their behaviour is always determined by
the current state of their balance sheets. We will call this programmed behaviour by
stressed banks the cascade mechanism.
We will suppose that our schematic economic crisis is triggered by a major macroe-
conomic event. This trigger event causes a large negative shock to the collection of
bank balance sheets, putting the system into a stressed initial state with balance sheets
B
(0)
i = B¯i + δBi. A typical trigger shock will involve one or both of the following ele-
mentary balance sheet changes to one or more banks:
1. An asset price shock causes changes δA = δE < 0.
2. A deposit withdrawal shock causes changes δD = δC < 0. Note that such a
demand withdrawal must be repaid immediately in cash in full.
The static cascade models we shall discuss in this section all share the timing and
operational assumptions A1-A3 listed in Section 1, which imply a cascade process that
proceeds in daily steps. The heuristic picture to have in mind is that the cascade is
a systemic crisis that develops quickly. As it proceeds a number of banks become
impaired, either defaulted or illiquid, and other banks adopt defensive behaviour to
protect themselves from the contagion. In all our examples, the resultant cascade
process leads to a sequence of collections of daily balance sheets B(n) := [B(n)i ]i∈[N ]
and exposures Ω(n) := [Ω(n)ij ]i,j∈[N ] for n ≥ 0. Each bank’s balance sheet has the form
B
(n)
i := [Z
(n)
i ,A
(n)
i ,C
(n)
i ,X
(n)
i ,D
(n)
i ,E
(n)
i ]. The accounting identity (1) is assumed to
hold at all times. However, some banks will be impaired, meaning either C(n)i < 0 or
E
(n)
i < 0, and our models must specify the protective strategies impaired banks will
adopt. We shall call these behavioural assumptions the cascade mechanism, and need
to explore the impact of this behaviour on both the financial system and its exterior.
Notation: We adopt a vector notation with banks indexed by the set [N ] :=
{1, . . . , N}. We define 0 = [0, . . . , 0], 1 = [1, . . . , 1] ∈ RN and for vectors x =
[xi]i∈[N ], y = [yi]i∈[N ] ∈ RN relations
x ≤ y means ∀ i, xi ≤ yi ,
x < y means x ≤ y, ∃ i : xi < yi ,
min(x, y) = [min(xi, yi)]i∈[N ] ,
max(x, y) = [max(xi, yi)]i∈[N ] ,
(x)+ = max(x,0)
(x)− = max(−x,0) = −min(x,0) .
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Whenever x ≤ y we define the hyperinterval [x, y] = {z : x ≤ z ≤ y}. The indicator
function of a condition P has the values
1(P ) =
{
1 if P holds,
0 otherwise.
2.1 The Eisenberg-Noe Model
The paper [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001] addressed the problem of finding the consistent
amounts that bank clients should pay in a centrally cleared payment system when one
or more client banks are insolvent and unable to pay their full obligation. As many
other papers have noted, a slight extension of their framework also serves as a very
basic model that determines the equilibrium collection of mark-to-market balance
sheets that represents the end result of a systemic crisis triggered by a shock that
causes one or more bank insolvency. Following [Hurd, 2016], we review this extended
model, henceforth called the EN model, and show how it can be reinterpreted as an
example of a static solvency cascade model satisfying all of Assumptions A.
We assume that the post-trigger bank balance sheets and exposures B(0),Ω(0) are
as shown in Table 1 and in addition
EN1 External debt is senior to interbank debt, and all interbank debt is of equal
seniority;
EN2 There are no losses due to bankruptcy charges.
Remark: Unlike [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001], we do not assume A(0)i +C
(0)
i −D(0)i ≥ 0.
Moreover, since liquidity is not a concern in the EN model, we need not distinguish
A(0) from C(0).
We focus on the fractional clearing vectors p = [p1, . . . , pN ] representing the frac-
tional recovery values of defaulted interbank debt, in the post-crisis equilibrium.
Again, this differs slightly from [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001]: in terms of fractional
clearing values, their clearing vectors are [p1X
(0)
1 , . . . , pNX
(0)
N ], with the convention
that pi = 0 for any bank with X
(0)
i = 0. The collection of fractional clearing vectors
p representing the end of the crisis is identified with the collection of fixed points of
the equation p = F(p) where F = [F1, . . . , FN ] with
Fi(p) := 1(X
(0)
i > 0) min
(
1,max
(
0, (A
(0)
i + C
(0)
i −D(0)i +
∑
j
Ω
(0)
ji pj)/X
(0)
i
))
. (2)
This equation has the meaning that the amount of interbank debt bank i can pay
depends on the interbank asset values realized from all other banks. A bank with
pi = 1 is solvent and can pay its full interbank debt; a bank with a fractional recovery
0 < pi < 1 is called partially insolvent; a fully insolvent bank has pi = 0 and cannot pay
all of its external debt. By similar reasoning, the fractional recovery of the external
debt of bank i is given by
qi = 1(D
(0)
i > 0) min
(
1, (A
(0)
i + C
(0)
i +
∑
j
Ω
(0)
ji pj)/D
(0)
i
)
. (3)
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The main theorem of [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001], slightly generalized, is
Theorem 1. Corresponding to every post-trigger financial system B(0),Ω(0) satisfying
Assumptions EN1, EN2 there exists a greatest and a least fractional clearing vector pˆ
and pˇ.
The proof of this theorem found in [Eisenberg and Noe, 2001] is based on the
Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem which states that the set of fixed points of a
monotone mapping of a complete lattice onto itself, is a complete lattice. In the above
context, the mapping F is monotone increasing from the hyperinterval (a complete
lattice) [0,1] onto itself. Since every complete lattice is non-empty and has a maximum
and minimum, the theorem follows.
2.1.1 Stock-flow Consistency
A stronger result than Theorem 1 is also true because the mapping F is everywhere
continuous. Continuity implies that pˆ must be the limit of the decreasing sequence
of iterates p(n) := F(p(n−1)) starting from p(0) = 1. Similarly, pˇ will be the limit
of the increasing sequence of iterates starting from p(0) = 0. Continuity of F thus
allows us to reinterpret the greatest fractional clearing vector pˆ as the end result of a
cascade process with the daily updating of the cascade mapping p(n) := F(p(n−1)) that
starts at time 0 from p(0) = 1. At step n, the balance sheets and exposures satisfy
the accounting identities (1) and have the form B(n)i = [Z
(n)
i ,A
(0)
i ,C
(0)
i ,X
(n)
i ,D
(n)
i ,E
(n)
i ]
with D(n)i = q
(n)
i D
(0)
i and Ω
(n)
ij = p
(n)
i Ω
(0)
ij . We now show how the full sequence of daily
balance sheets B(n) and exposures Ω(n) connect in a way that obeys Assumptions A1,
A2, and A3, and in particular how the cascade mapping can be broken down further
into stock-flow consistent steps.
It turns out to be useful to track each bank’s default buffer
∆
(n)
i := A
(0)
i + C
(0)
i +
∑
j
p
(n)
j Ω
(0)
ji −D(0)i −X(0)i . (4)
Note that the difference
∑
j(1− p(n)j )Ω(0)ji between ∆(0)i := E(0)i and ∆(n)i is a measure
of the total impact on the equity of bank i after n days due to losses in its interbank
assets. The vectors p(n) and ∆(n) are expressible recursively in terms of p(n−1) and
∆(n−1) through the equations
p
(n)
i = 1(X
(0)
i > 0) h(∆
(n−1)
i /X
(0)
i ) (5)
∆
(n)
i = ∆
(0)
i −
∑
j
Ω
(0)
ji (1− p(n−1)j ) (6)
where the normalized threshold function h from the extended real line [−∞,∞] to the
unit interval [0, 1] is
h(x) = (x+ 1)+ − x+ = min(1,max(0, x+ 1) . (7)
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The vector ∆(n−1) also determines the recovery fraction of external debt at step n
q
(n)
i = 1(D
(0)
i > 0) h((∆
(n−1)
i + X
(0)
i )/D
(0)
i ) . (8)
The nth step of the EN cascade can be given a stock-flow consistent interpretation
as an attempt by the system to resolve defaulted banks simultaneously through an
orderly bail-in restructuring of their debt [Avgouleas and Goodhart, 2015], followed
by a mark-to-market update of interbank assets. Precisely, we will verify that the nth
solvency step S given by (5),(6),(8) can be broken down into three more elementary
steps as follows
S1 For every bank i with −X(n−1)i ≤ E(n−1)i < 0, all of the interbank debts of i are
restructured, or revalued at a fraction p˙(n)i =
X
(n−1)
i +E
(n−1)
i
X
(n−1)
i
< 1. If
E
(n−1)
i < −X(n−1)i , then p˙(n)i = 0 and the external debt of i is now restructured,
or revalued at a fraction q˙(n)i =
D
(n−1)
i +X
(n−1)
i +E
(n−1)
i
D
(n−1)
i
< 1. Solvent banks are not
restructured, so one has in general
p˙
(n)
i = 1(X
(n−1)
i > 0) h(E
(n−1)
i /X
(n−1)
i ) , (9)
q˙
(n)
i = 1(D
(n−1)
i > 0) h
(
(X
(n−1)
i + E
(n−1)
i )/D
(n−1)
i
)
. (10)
S2 All of the interbank exposures on insolvent banks i are revalued, X(n)i = p˙
(n)
i X
(n−1)
i ,
Ω
(n)
ij = p˙
(n)
i Ω
(n−1)
ij , and the external debt is revalued at D
(n)
i = q˙
(n)
i D
(n−1)
i . Based
on these revaluations, each insolvent bank i now has precisely zero equity since
A
(0)
i + C
(0)
i + Z
(n−1)
i = D
(n)
i + X
(n)
i .
S3 However, interbank assets must also be revalued: All banks j now mark-to-
market their interbank assets in light of the restructured debt of insolvent banks,
meaning that Z(n)j =
∑
i Ω
(n)
ij . This revaluation leads to new equity values
E
(n)
i = A
(0)
i +C
(0)
i +Z
(n)
i −D(n)i −X(n)i = (E(n−1)i )+−
∑
j
(1− p˙(n)j )Ω(n−1)ji . (11)
The following theorem confirms that this defines a stock-flow consistent mapping
(B(n),Ω(n)) = S(B(n−1),Ω(n−1)) that generates all steps of the EN 2001 cascade. This
result is important because it breaks down the cascade into elementary steps that are
demonstrably consistent with stylized accounting principles.
Theorem 2. Let the collection of initial balance sheets B(0)i := [Z
(0)
i ,A
(0)
i ,C
(0)
i =
0,X
(0)
i ,D
(0)
i ,E
(0)
i ] and initial interbank exposures Ω
(0)
ij be a financial system satis-
fying the accounting identities (1). Let the sequence of balance sheets and expo-
sures (B(n),Ω(n)) be defined iteratively for n > 0 by the steps S1-S3, so in partic-
ular equations (9), (10), (11) hold. Then the sequence of recovery fractions p(n)i =
11
∏n
m=1 p˙
(m)
i , q
(n)
i =
∏n
m=1 q˙
(m)
i and solvency buffers defined by
∆
(n)
i = E
(n)
i −
n−1∑
m=0
(E
(m)
i )
− (12)
satisfies the EN cascade formulas (5), (6) and (8).
Note that equations (9),(11) give an autonomous discrete dynamics for the se-
quence of vector pairs p(n),E(n). This dynamics depends on the values of X(0),E(0)
and Ω(0) but does not depend on the values of A(0),C(0),D(0). Impact on external
debt arises only through (10), which brings in dependence on D(0). Finally, external
assets, both liquid and fixed, remain unchanged during the EN solvency cascade.
Proof. First, (6) will follow from (12) and ∆(0)i = E
(0)
i if we show
∆
(n)
i = ∆
(n−1)
i + Z
(n)
i − Z(n−1)i , n > 0 . (13)
In the case E(n−1)i > 0 then certainly (E
(m)
i )
− = 0 for all m < n and hence (12)
implies ∆(m)i = E
(m)
i for all m ≤ n. In this case, (11) implies (13) for all m ≤ n. In
the opposite case E(n−1)i ≤ 0, then (11) implies that E(n)i = Z(n)i − Z(n−1)i . From (12),
because (E(n−1)i )
− = −E(n−1)i , we find that again (13) holds:
∆
(n)
i = E
(n)
i −
n−1∑
m=0
(E
(m)
i )
− = E(n)i + E
(n−1)
i −
n−2∑
m=0
(E
(m)
i )
−
= Z
(n)
i − Z(n−1)i + ∆(n−1)i .
For p(n)i as defined by the Theorem, we have X
(n)
i = p
(n)
i X
(0)
i = p˙
(n)
i X
(n−1)
i . Now
(9) implies that p˙(n)i X
(n−1)
i = (X
(n−1)
i + E
(n−1)
i )
+ − (E(n−1)i )+. From the equation
∆
(n−1)
i = E
(n−1)
i − (X(0)i −X(n−1)i )− (D(0)i −D(n−1)i )
and that facts that E(n−1)i > −X(n−1)i implies D(0)i = D(n−1)i and E(n−1)i > 0 implies
X
(0)
i = X
(n−1)
i it follows that (X
(n−1)
i + E
(n−1)
i )
+ = (X
(0)
i + ∆
(n−1)
i )
+ and (E(n−1)i )
+ =
(∆
(n−1)
i )
+. Therefore p(n)i X
(0)
i = (X
(0)
i + ∆
(n−1)
i )
+ − (∆(n−1)i )+ which is equivalent to
(5). The proof that (8) holds for q(n)i as defined by the Theorem is similar.
uunionsq
Modifications and Extensions: There are several simple but important possible
modifications that will add realism and flexibility to the above foundation solvency
cascade model in future work.
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1. Bankruptcy Costs: The threshold function h(x) encodes the “zero bankruptcy
costs” assumption EN2 corresponding to a “soft” type of default whereas in real-
ity we expect that bankruptcy charges will not be negligible, and may severely
impact the course of a financial crisis. Losses given default can be encoded using
modified threshold functions:
(a) In the paper [Gai and Kapadia, 2010] interbank debt on defaulted banks is
assumed to recover zero value. Their cascade model has the EN 2001 form
with a single modification that replaces the threshold function h(x) that
appears in (5) by
h˜(x) = 1(x ≥ 0)
They justify zero recovery with the statement2: “This assumption is likely to
be realistic in the midst of a crisis: in the immediate aftermath of a default,
the recovery rate and the timing of recovery will be highly uncertain and
banks’ funders are likely to assume the worst-case scenario.”
(b) For any two positive fractions R1, R2 < 1, a fractional loss of (1−R1) paid
on interbank debt at the instant of primary default followed by a fractional
loss of (1 − R2) paid on external debt at the instant of secondary default
can be modelled by replacing h(x) by h(R1)(x) in (5) and by h(R2)(x) in (8)
where h(R)(x) = (1−R)h˜(x) +Rh(x/R).
2. Debt Seniority: Assumption EN1 can be replaced by more general seniority
structures. For example, portions of the external debt might have seniority equal
to the interbank debt. This can be accommodated by the trick of introducing a
“fictitious bank” with label i = 0, that never defaults and lends amounts Ω¯i0 to
other banks i ∈ [N ]. [Gourieroux et al., 2012] studied solvency cascades where
banks may have equity crossholdings and debt structured with multiple seniority
tranches.
2.2 Generalized Liquidity Cascade Model
The sum over debtor banks in the cascade mapping (6) demonstrates that solvency
cascades are characterized by shocks that are transmitted “downstream”, from de-
faulting banks to the asset side of their creditor banks’ balance sheets. Two models,
by [Gai et al., 2011] and [Lee, 2013], illustrate that (funding) liquidity cascades are
a systemic phenomenon in which shocks are naturally transmitted “upstream”, from
creditor banks to their debtors. Next we extend and unify these two liquidity cas-
cade models, and interpret the resultant “Generalized Liquidity Cascade Model” (GL
cascade model), first introduced in [Hurd, 2016] (Section 2.2.3), as a stock-flow consis-
tent scheme. Just as a solvency cascade results when the system attempts to resolve
insolvent banks, liquidity cascades will be understood to arise as the system attempts
to resolve illiquid banks, that is banks with Ci < 0. Such illiquid banks are compelled
2[Gai and Kapadia, 2010], footnote 9.
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to raise additional cash by selling or liquidating assets, either interbank assets Z or
fixed assets A.
We consider again a sequence of bank balance sheets B(n)i := [Z
(n)
i ,A
(n)
i ,C
(n)
i ,
X
(n)
i ,D
(n)
i ,E
(n)
i ] as shown in Table 1, and interbank exposures Ω
(n)
ij . In addition to
Assumptions A, the GL cascade model also assumes
GL1 Illiquid banks raise cash by first selling interbank assets. When interbank assets
have been completely sold, illiquid banks then sell external assets. At each step,
illiquid banks sell exactly the minimal amount of assets needed to repay their
depositor withdrawals;
GL2 There are no losses due to market price impact when interbank and external
assets are sold.
In this baseline version of the model, the unrealistic assumption GL2 allows us to
focus solely on liquidity and to avoid discussion of solvency issues. This deficiency
will be corrected in Section 4.
The event triggering the systemic crisis on day 0 is assumed to be a vector of
deposit withdrawal shocks δD = δC ≤ 0 that hits any or all of the banks and leaves
some banks illiquid. The initial balance sheets have the form B(0) = B¯ − δB with
some initially illiquid banks having C(0) = C¯ + δC < 0 that must liquidate assets
first from Z¯ and when these assets are depleted, from A¯. Selling interbank assets is
the same thing as recalling interbank loans, and so this action will inflict additional
“secondary” liquidity shocks to other debtor banks’ liabilities: this domino-like effect
is the core of the liquidity cascade mechanism. An illiquid bank that has sold all of Z¯
will be called “fully illiquid”, and must sell external fixed assets A¯ in order to survive.
We now focus on p˜(n)i , the fraction of bank i’s initial interbank assets that remain
unsold after n steps of the funding liquidity cascade, starting with p˜(0)i = 1. Illiquid
banks will be those with p˜(n)i < 1 while normal banks have p˜
(n)
i = 1.
By following logic that parallels the development of equations (5)-(8), one sees
it is now helpful to define Σ(n)i , the liquidity buffer of bank i after n cascade steps,
that measures the resilience of the bank to deposit withdrawals. This takes the initial
value Σ(0)i = C
(0)
i and as the cascade progresses Σ
(0)
i −Σ(n)i represents the cumulative
amount of deposit withdrawals that the bank has repaid up to day n. This difference
is entirely due to the additional deposit withdrawals needed to repay interbank loans,
and thus
Σ
(n)
i = Σ
(0)
i −
∑
j
Ω
(0)
ij (1− p˜(n−1)j ) , (14)
where the sum is over creditor banks of i. The fraction of Z(0)i not sold by day n must
be
p˜
(n)
i = 1(Z
(0)
i > 0) h(Σ
(n−1)
i /Z
(0)
i ) (15)
where h(x) is the threshold function (7). Finally, the fraction q˜(n)i of bank i’s external
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fixed asset A(0)i not sold by day n must be
q˜
(n)
i = 1(A
(0)
i > 0) h
(
(Σ
(n−1)
i + Z
(0)
i )/A
(0)
i
)
. (16)
The three equations (14)-(16) defining the GL cascade model are fully consistent
with Assumptions GL. Moreover, comparison with (5)-(8) reveals that the GL cascade
model is precisely equivalent to the EN cascade model described in Section 2.1, with
the role of assets/liabilities, equity/cash and liquidity/default buffers simultaneously
interchanged: A↔ D,Z↔ X,C↔ E, ∆↔ Σ. It follows that the GL cascade model
admits an autonomous stock-flow consistent formulation that is dual to the solvency
step S described in Section 2.1.1. Each liquidity step L can be understood as an
attempt by the system to resolve all banks with a negative cash balance. Just as the
solvency step can be viewed as arising under the supervision of a system regulator
that dictates the restructuring of insolvent banks, the liquidity cascade arises when the
system regulator also determines how illiquid banks should be resolved. As clarified in
Section 3, we will interpret negative cash balances as overdrafts drawn from a “Lender
of Last Resort" (LLR) in the sense of [Bagehot, 1873]. This is a second role of the
system regulator in addition to acting as “bank resolver” as in Section 2.1.1. Each
liquidity step L maps a collection [B,Ω] of balance sheets and exposures to a new
collection [B′,Ω′] as follows
L1 For every illiquid bank i with −Zi ≤ Ci < 0, a fraction 1 − ˙˜pi of the interbank
assets of i are sold, where ˙˜pi =
Zi+Ci
Zi
< 1. If Ci < −Zi, then ˙˜pi = 0 and a
fraction 1− ˙˜qi of external assets of i are sold, where ˙˜qi = Ai+Zi+CiAi < 1.
L2 The unsold (or rolled-over) interbank exposures held by illiquid banks i are
valued at Z′i = ˙˜piZi,Ω
′
ji =
˙˜piΩji and the unsold external assets are valued at
AF
′
i =
˙˜qiAi. Based on these asset sales, each illiquid bank i has now raised
cash (1− ˙˜qi)Ai + (1− ˙˜pi)Zi = (Ci)− which is precisely enough to pay the LLR
overdraft.
L3 However, interbank debt called by illiquid banks must be repaid: All banks j
repay
∑
i(1− ˙˜pi)Ωji of called debt of illiquid banks, leaving the value X′j =
∑
i Ω
′
ji
of remaining interbank debt. These debt payments lead to new values of liquidity
buffers:
C ′j = (Cj)
+ −
∑
i
(1− ˙˜pi)Ωji . (17)
Modifications and Extensions:
1. The model of [Lee, 2013] supposes that instead of GL1, deposit withdrawals are
paid by selling liquid external assets (or “cash”) and interbank assets in equal
proportion until depleted, and thereafter liquidating fixed external assets. One
can verify that this model is a variation of the above GL framework obtained
by introducing a fictitious bank with i = 0 that borrows Ω(0)0j from each bank
j, and by taking C¯i = 0 for all i. This has the effect of making all the banks
initially “illiquid” since the initial liquidity buffers are C(0)i = δDi ≤ 0.
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2. The model of [Gai et al., 2011] aims to describe liquidity freezes observed in past
crises and is equivalent to a variation of the GL cascade model that replaces the
function h(x) in (15) by hλ(x) = λ1(x > 0) + (1− λ) for a parameter λ ∈ [0, 1].
3. One may also take the interbank assets in Λ classes ordered by degree of liquidity,
with class ` = 1 the most liquid class. For example, one might assume that
` labels interbank loans of different maturity (including the external loans as
lending to bank i = 0), which the banks liquidate in increasing order.
4. Finally, one must expect that illiquid banks incur additional expenses or liq-
uidation penalties, for example punitive interest rates charged by the LLR or
penalties for early withdrawal of interbank loans. Such cash penalties further
erode both the bank’s cash buffer and equity buffer.
3 Solvency and Liquidity Cascade Model
The stock-flow consistent forms of the EN solvency cascade model of Section 2.1.1
and the GL cascade model of Section 3.1 can be intertwined in a natural way to give a
financial network cascade model unifying the two channels of direct contagion (i) and
(ii) discussed in the Introduction. The resultant Solvency and Liquidity (SL) cascade
model which we now describe rests on simple yet financially reasonable assumptions.
In fact, we propose it as the simplest possible financially justifiable cascade model
that like the model of Hurd et al. [2016] unifies solvency and liquidity.
As in the previous models, the post-trigger initial balance sheet of bank i has the
form B(0)i = [Z
(0)
i ,A
(0)
i ,C
(0)
i ,X
(0)
i ,D
(0)
i ,E
(0)
i ]. Following the triggering event, which
might be a combination of major external deposit withdrawals or external fixed asset
price declines, the system at this moment is assumed to be impaired, which means
some of the banks have either C(0)i < 0 (illiquid) or E
(0)
i < 0 (insolvent).
The resultant crisis cascade is interpreted mechanistically as a specification of how
the entire system, guided by a system regulator, iteratively rebalances its balance
sheets to resolve bank insolvencies and repay bank overdrafts, aiming each day to
restore compliance with all accounting constraints. It does so by applying two steps
alternately. During the first step S, called the restructuring or solvency step, the in-
solvent banks in the system undergo a bail-in restructuring of their debt in an attempt
to restore their negative equity to zero. Subsequently, however, the systemic effect of
interbank debt restructuring causes a further negative impact on the network likely
to cause additional bank insolvencies. In the second step L, called the asset liquida-
tion or liquidity step, illiquid banks attempt to restore their negative cash position to
zero by recalling loans, or as we prefer to say, by selling interbank and fixed assets.
Subsequently, however, the systemic effect of interbank asset liquidation is a further
negative impact on the network in the form of additional interbank funding illiquidity.
The SL cascade model is based on Assumptions A1-A4 and the following more
refined versions of assumptions EN1-EN2 and GL1-GL2.
SL1 There is a system regulator that combines two functions
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(a) It acts as a lender of last resort (LLR)3 that lends to illiquid banks (with
C < 0) to allow them to make essential payments to other banks. Such
loans are without interest, and must be repaid within one period.
(b) It enforces the minimal restructuring of insolvent banks’ debt (with E < 0)
to return their equity to zero, through “bailing in” of creditors that take a
loss on their insolvent exposures.
SL2 Interbank lending is overnight, and illiquid banks always make required pay-
ments on maturing interbank exposures with cash, or if illiquid, by borrowing
from the LLR.
SL3 External debt is senior to interbank debt, which implies insolvent banks pay all
their external debt before paying any interbank debt. External assets are less
liquid than interbank assets, which implies illiquid banks sell their interbank
assets before selling any external assets.
SL4 There no direct losses, costs or penalties due to bankruptcy or illiquidity.
SL5 There is no market price impact when interbank and external assets are sold.
External depositors are fully insured and have no incentive to withdraw funding
from failing banks.
Remark: If necessary, external debt of equal seniority to interbank debt can be
included as debt from a “fictitious” bank i = 0 that is never insolvent or illiquid.
Similarly, external assets of equal liquidity to interbank assets can be included as
loans to this fictitious bank i = 0.
We now specify how balance sheets and exposures on day n− 1, B(n−1)i = [Z(n−1)i ,
A
(n−1)
i ,C
(n−1)
i ,X
(n−1)
i ,D
(n−1)
i ,E
(n−1)
i ] and Ω
(n−1)
ij , are updated to day n. This SL
cascade mapping C is a composition C = L ◦ S as the system regulator applies first
the solvency step S as specified by S1-S3, and then the liquidity step L as specified
by L1-L3.
SL Cascade Mapping: The mapping C = L ◦ S from day n − 1 to day n acts on
the data [Ω(n−1)ij , p
(n−1)
i , p˜
(n−1)
i ,E
(n−1)
i ,C
(n−1)
i ] as follows
1. The exposures at step n− 1 are Ω(n−1)ij = p(n−1)i p˜(n−1)j Ω(0)ij and hence
X
(n−1)
i = p
(n−1)
i
∑
j
p˜
(n−1)
j Ω
(0)
ij ,Z
(n−1)
i = p˜
(n−1)
i
∑
j
p
(n−1)
j Ω
(0)
ji . (18)
2. The solvency step S produces
p
(n)
i = p
(n−1)
i p˙
(n)
i , p˙
(n)
i = 1(X
(n−1)
i > 0)h(E
(n−1)
i /X
(n−1)
i ) (19)
E
(n)
j = (E
(n−1)
j )
+ −
∑
i
(1− p˙(n)i )Ω(n−1)ij (20)
3Think of this as Bagehot’s concept [Rochet and Vives, 2004].
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and intermediate values for interbank assets
Z˜
(n)
i =
∑
j
p˙
(n)
j Ω
(n−1)
ij . (21)
3. The liquidation step L produces
p˜
(n)
i = p˜
(n−1)
i
˙˜p
(n)
i ,
˙˜p
(n)
i = 1(Z˜
(n)
i > 0)h(C
(n−1)
i /Z˜
(n)
i ) (22)
C
(n)
j = (C
(n−1)
j )
+ − p˙(n)j
∑
i
(1− ˙˜p(n)i )Ω(n−1)ji . (23)
4. One also reconstructs the solvency and liquidity buffers:
∆
(n)
i = E
(n)
i −
n−1∑
m=0
(E
(m)
i )
− (24)
Σ
(n)
i = C
(n)
i −
n−1∑
m=0
(C
(m)
i )
− . (25)
5. The external fixed assets and debts A(n)i = q˜
(n)
i A
(0)
i , D
(n)
i = q
(n)
i D
(0)
i are deter-
mined in terms of supplementary quantities q(n−1)i , q˜
(n−1)
i :
q
(n)
i = q
(n−1)
i q˙
(n)
i (26)
q˙
(n)
i = 1(D
(n−1)
i > 0)h
(
(E
(n−1)
i + X
(n−1)
i )/D
(n−1)
i
)
, (27)
q˜
(n)
i = q˜
(n−1)
i
˙˜q
(n)
i (28)
˙˜q
(n)
i = 1(A
(n−1)
i > 0)h
(
(C
(n−1)
i + Z˜
(n)
i )/A
(n−1)
i
)
. (29)
It is important to note that Steps 1-3 of the SL cascade mapping form an au-
tonomous system of equations for a reduced set of variables [p(n−1)i , p˜
(n−1)
i ,E
(n−1)
i ,
C
(n−1)
i ], depending also on the initial exposure matrix Ω
(0)
ij but in particular do not
depend on A(0),D(0). Of course, Step 5 gives the impact of the cascade on the external
assets and debt, and does depend on the initial data A,D.
Given that the SL mapping is essentially an AL symmetric version of the Eisenberg-
Noe model, the following result is not surprising. However, the proof requires an
additional step.
Theorem 3. The limit limn→∞(L◦S)n(B(0)) starting from the initial state B(0) with
exposures Ω(0) and p(0) = p˜(0) = 1 is the maximal fixed point Bˆ of
B = (L ◦ S)(B)
and has the following properties:
1. Bˆ = S(Bˆ) = L(Bˆ).
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2. Eˆj ≥ 0. The bank is insolvent if and only if Eˆj = 0.
3. Cˆj ≥ 0. The bank is illiquid if and only if Cˆj = 0.
Thus, the cascade is monotonically increasing in severity, and ends in an equilib-
rium state where all insolvent banks have exactly zero equity, and all illiquid banks
have exactly zero cash assets and owe zero to the LLR. One can also see that if
p∗i = 0, then the bank becomes fully insolvent (meaning no interbank debt can be re-
paid). Similarly, if p˜∗i = 0, then the bank ends up fully illiquid (meaning all interbank
assets have been sold).
Proof: We wish to apply the Knaster-Tarski Fixed Point Theorem as done for the
Eisenberg-Noe result (Theorem 1) but the mapping C = L ◦ S defined by (18)-(23) is
not monotonically decreasing in the variables [p(n)i , p˜
(n)
i ,E
(n)
i ,C
(n)
i ]i∈[N ]. However, the
following mapping C˜ on the variables [p(n−1)i , p(n)i , p˜(n−1)i , p˜(n)i , (E(n−1)i )+,
(C
(n−1)
i )
+] is monotonic and bounded on the set L of points ` := [xi, yi, x˜i, y˜i,Ei,
Ci]i∈[N ] ∈ R6N satisfying the inequalities 0 ≤ yi ≤ xi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y˜i ≤ x˜i ≤ 1,
0 ≤ Ei ≤ (E(0)i )+, 0 ≤ Ci ≤ (C(0)i )+ for each i ∈ [N ]
1. Compute E(n)i from (20), and note that (E
(n)
i )
+ ≤ (E(n−1)i )+;
2. Compute C(n)i from (23), and note that (C
(n)
i )
+ ≤ (C(n−1)i )+;
3. Compute p(n+1)i from (19) with X
(n)
i computed from (18), and note that p
(n+1)
i ≤
p
(n)
i ;
4. Compute p˜(n+1)i from (22) with Z˜
(n+1)
i computed from (21), and note that
p˜
(n+1)
i ≤ p˜(n)i .
Moreover, C˜ maps the set L onto itself. Since L is a complete lattice, the existence of
fixed points of C˜ is guaranteed by the Knaster-Tarski Theorem.
Since C˜ is also a continuous mapping, the iteration scheme starting from the max-
imal initial state `(0) = [1,1,1,1, (E(0))+, (C(0))+] with exposures Ω(0) must converge
to the maximal fixed point ˆ` of the mapping C˜. One can easily verify that ˆ` has the
form [pˆ, pˆ, ˆ˜p, ˆ˜p, (Eˆ)+, (Cˆ)+] where (Eˆ)+ = Eˆ and (Cˆ)+ = Cˆ. In other words, Proper-
ties 2 and 3 of the Theorem hold. Clearly also ˆ` determines the maximal fixed point
Bˆ of C, which necessarily satisfies Property 1.
The clearing condition: It appears one cannot characterize the fixed points of C
in terms of a lower dimensional mapping analogous to the N dimensional EN clearing
condition p = F(p). For example, unlike (6) from that single cascade model, the
information of the vectors p(n), p˜(n) for fixed n is not sufficient to determine the
buffers ∆(n),Σ(n).
4 Extended SL Cascade Model
Bank insolvencies and illiquidity both induce shocks that are mediated directly through
the interbank exposures. Such direct feedback effects are internal to the financial net-
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work. A complete picture of systemic risk must also consider indirect feedback between
the financial system and the external economy, represented in our framework by the
external fixed assets A and external debt D. The SL cascade model of Section 3 can-
not be taken seriously as a model of systemic risk, because Assumption SL5 rules out
indirect feedback effects. The extended solvency and liquidity (ESL) cascade model we
now introduce builds in stylized indirect feedback effects that overcome Assumption
SL5.
The literature on indirect contagion separates into asset side contagion and liability
side contagion. External asset contagion is often called the asset fire sale effect, and
has been understood as a primary component in historical financial crises (see [Shleifer
and Vishny, 1992, Cifuentes et al., 2005] and references cited therein). A quantitative
discussion of the role of securitization and the fire sales that took hold in these products
during the 2007-08 crisis can be found in [Shin, 2009]. On the other hand, external
liability contagion, which has also been called rollover risk or bank panic risk, is also
thought to be a significant component of crises (see [Calomiris and Gorton, 1991,
Rochet and Vives, 2004, Liu, 2016] and references cited therein). The ESL cascade
model views external asset and liability contagion as two sides of the same coin, and
models them accordingly, providing a minimal description of both phenomena that
can anchor more complex explanations. A recent paper [Aldasoro and Faia, 2016]
provides an alternative framework that similarly combines asset side contagion and
liability side contagion in a network model for optimizing banks subject to regulatory
constraints.
4.1 Asset fire sales
Let us follow [Cifuentes et al., 2005] in supposing for simplicity that banks hold shares
of a common fixed external asset. This 100% asset correlation assumption can be
viewed as a worst-case assessment of the diversification strategies adopted by banks,
and leads to the strongest possible fire sale effect. An extended network model with
multiple asset classes has been introduced by [Caccioli et al., 2014]. Without loss of
generality, this common asset is assumed to have an initial share price Π(0) = 1 of
which each bank i initially holds A(0)i units. At step n of the crisis, the liquidation
step L implies that some illiquid banks may sell fixed assets: based on equation (28),
the number of units held by bank i will be reduced from q˜(n−1)i A
(0)
i to q˜
(n)
i A
(0)
i . Other
banks may also reduce their appetite for purchasing additional units of the external
asset. Since financial institutions are large traders, such asset sales combined with
reduced demand may have significant market impact, meaning they cause a permanent
downward shift in the underlying asset price Π. Such asset price changes will lead
to declines in external asset values A(n)i = Π
(n)q˜
(n)
i A
(0)
i of every bank in the network
that are one-to-one with declines in their equity buffers.
We assume the final asset price paid by the external market at the end of any
period is given by a pricing function P (s− d) of s− d, the excess supply over demand
for the asset by the banking system over this period. That is, s − d is the difference
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between the total amount sold s and the change in system demand d, over the period.
We also assume that the system demand is linear in the liquid assets in the system, so
that d = µ`+µ′`′, where ` and `′ are respectively the total amount of liquid interbank
and cash assets added by the system and the constants µ, µ′ ∈ [0, 1] represent the
capacity of these liquid funds to purchase the fixed asset. Note that the available
liquidity of the interbank and cash market, and hence d, all decrease during the crisis.
The pricing function P should be monotonically decreasing and convex in s − d and
thus in the following we adopt the choice of [Cifuentes et al., 2005]
P (s− d) = Π(0)e−α(s−d) (30)
where Π(0) = 1 is the price at the beginning of the period. The positive constant
α−1 represents the depth of the demand for the fixed asset by the external market: a
heuristic rule that the price is reduced by 50% when the system sells 100% of its fixed
assets leads to the value α = log 2/
∑
i Ai.
The LA step of the ESL cascade model is a modification of L that accounts for
the impact of the decline in the asset price Π on the equity of banks. In terms of the
quantities described in Section 3,
1. The total amount of external asset sold s, the total amount of interbank assets
sold `, and the total amount of cash assets lost `′ change recursively as banks
become illiquid:
s(n) = s(n−1) +
∑
i
(1− ˙˜q(n)i )q˜(n−1)i A(0)i , s(0) = 0 (31)
`(n) =
∑
i
(Z
(n)
i − Z(0)i ) (32)
`
′(n) =
∑
i
(C
(n)
i − C(0)i ) . (33)
2. The asset price is determined recursively by
Π(n) = Π(n−1) (34)
× exp
[
−
∑
i
(
α(1− ˙˜q(n)i )q˜(n−1)i A(0)i + β(Z(n−1)i − Z(n)i ) + β′(C(n−1)i )− C(n)i )
)]
with Π(0) = 1 and β = αµ, β′ = αµ′.
3. Since changes in the mark-to-market value of fixed assets are one-to-one with
changes in the equity buffer there is an additional change in banks’ equity:
E
(n)
i = E˜
(n)
i − (Π(n−1) −Π(n))q˜(n)i A(0)i , (35)
where E˜(n)i denotes the intermediate equity buffer at the end of the solvency
step.
In summary, inclusion of the fire sale effect into the SL framework amounts to an
additional impact to the solvency buffers through equation (35), over and above the
impact due to devaluation of interbank assets due to defaults.
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4.2 Bank panics and external funding shocks
A bank panic can be said to occur when the holders of external debt (which we call
depositors) collectively lose confidence in the banking system, and therefore make a
significant withdrawal of funding to the system. Since this second channel of indirect
contagion has been little studied in the economics literature, we find it helpful to model
it as the AL symmetric analogue of the single asset fire sale mechanism described
above. Therefore, in the following, the collection of depositors is viewed as a single pool
whose confidence in the financial system as a whole is reduced by debt restructuring
and drops in equity of any one bank. On day n, the depositor pool holds Π˜(n)D(0)i units
of the external debt of bank i, with a unit price q(n)i that evolves through equation
(26) of the solvency step S, giving a total value
D
(n)
i = Π˜
(n)q
(n)
i D
(0)
i . (36)
The single pool assumption has the meaning that debt restructuring or a decrease in
equity of any one bank through the solvency step S has the same proportional effect
on the fractional amount Π˜(n) of all banks’ external debt. Note that this is a strong
assumption that implies for example that nervous depositors are unable to identify
and run on particularly weak banks.
We have seen in Section 3 that a deposit withdrawal is the AL symmetric dual of
an asset price drop: both lead to a one-to-one impact on one buffer while leaving the
other buffer unchanged. Bankers directly control the number of units of fixed assets
they hold by trading, but cannot directly control the asset price. Analogously, bank
i cannot directly control the number of units of debt since it accepts all new deposits
and honours all deposit withdrawals, but the unit price of its debt q(n)i is reduced
through restructuring.
We therefore suppose that the total fractional amount of external debt Π˜ is nega-
tively related to the total amount of restructured external debt s˜, the total interbank
debt lost d˜, and the total banking system equity lost e˜. These dependencies are deter-
mined through a deposit impact function Π˜ = P˜ (s˜, d˜, e˜) for the fraction of the initial
system-wide aggregated external debt that is not yet withdrawn. In parallel with (30)
we suppose a linear relation between s˜, d˜, e˜ and log Π˜:
P˜ (s˜, d˜, e˜) = e−α˜s˜−β˜d˜−β˜
′e˜ (37)
where α˜, β˜, β˜′ are confidence weakening parameters. A formula similar to (37), given
in [Aldasoro and Faia, 2016], can be microfounded using the theory of global games
[Morris and Shin, 2003].
The SD step of the ESL cascade model is a modification of the S step that incor-
porates the bank panic contagion mechanism by accounting for the impact on cash
buffers of all banks due to additional withdrawals by depositors. At the end of the
SD step on day n of the crisis each bank i has external debt valued by (36).
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1. The total amount of restructured external debt s˜, the total interbank debt lost d˜
and the total bank equity lost e˜ all grow as banks become increasingly insolvent:
s˜(n) = s˜(n−1) +
∑
i
(1− q˙(n)i )q(n−1)i D(0)i , s˜(0) = 0 (38)
d˜(n) =
∑
i
(X
(0)
i −X(n)i ) (39)
e˜(n) =
∑
i
(E
(0)
i − E(n)i ) . (40)
2. The total fraction of external deposits not yet withdrawn is
Π˜(n) = Π˜(n−1) (41)
× exp
(
−
∑
i
(
α˜(1− q˙(n)i )q(n−1)i D(0)i + β˜(X(n−1)i −X(n)i ) + β˜′(E(n−1)i − E(n)i )
))
while the fraction of external deposits withdrawn on day n is Π˜(n−1) − Π˜(n).
3. The cash buffers at the end of the SD step, after accounting for the external
debt withdrawals that must be repaid, are
C˜
(n)
i = C
(n−1)
i − (Π˜(n−1) − Π˜(n))q(n)i D(0)i . (42)
From equation (42) one sees clearly how external deposit withdrawals, caused
by the dwindling confidence of the external lenders in the solvency of the financial
system, impact the cash positions of banks. The extent to which this effect can
influence the development of a financial crisis is thus ready to be understood within
the ESL framework.
4.3 ESL Cascade Mapping
We have seen that the asset fire sale contagion channel can be incorporated as a
modification LA of the liquidity step L. The bank panic contagion channel is incorpo-
rated as a modification SD of the solvency step S. The complete ESL cascade model
amounts to iterating the composition LA ◦ SD, starting with the post-trigger balance
sheets B(0) and exposures Ω(0):
(B(n),Ω(n)) = LA(SD(B(n−1),Ω(n−1))), n ≥ 1 . (43)
Comparison of equations (38)-(42) with equations (31)-(35) shows clearly how our
assumption of AL duality between the LA and SD mechanisms preserves the symmetry
of the ESL cascade model.
It is not difficult to extend the proof of Theorem 3 to the ESL Cascade Mapping,
leading to the obvious conclusions about the convergence of the cascade iteration
scheme to a maximal fixed point.
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Figure 1: A schematic representation of the ESL cascade model, showing how the two direct
contagion channels L and S intertwine with the two indirect contagion channels, fire sales
and bank panics. Two important effects not in the basic ESL cascade model described in
Section 4, namely liquidation penalties and bankruptcy charges, are also included in this
diagram for completeness.
Figure 1 shows schematically where the various types of shocks incorporated in the
ESL cascade model are created and have impact. We emphasize that the geometric
symmetries of the figure correspond to consequences of the AL symmetric modelling
assumptions we have made, and are realized in symmetries of dynamics within the
ESL cascade mapping.
Finally, we note that the missing arrows in Figure 1 corresponding to various types
of liquidation and bankruptcy penalties, are easily incorporated in the ESL cascade
models by including additional negative terms in equations (35) and (42).
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5 Discussion
The most important insights, and potential criticisms, of this paper stem from the
imposition of stock-flow consistency on systemic risk models. In hindsight, Theorem
2 states a somewhat obvious fact, not previously noticed, about the original model of
[Eisenberg and Noe, 2001]. However, viewing the EN clearing condition as resulting
from an iterated stock-flow consistent “solvency step” brings in the interpretation
of an ideal system regulator that enforces an orderly “bail-in” resolution mechanism
for insolvent banks. Since the reality of bank resolution is much messier and more
damaging than how we have modelled it here, one has a strong reason for being
skeptical of the EN model as a systemic risk model of insolvency. Analogously, in the
Generalized Liquidity cascade model one finds the need for the regulator to act as a
lender of last resort to ensure functioning of the interbank lending market during a
crisis. In this case, however, the iterated liquidation step is a reasonable picture of
how banks manage deposit withdrawals.
Just as stock-flow consistency leads to a clear picture of insolvency and illiquidity
viewed separately, the Solvency-Liquidity (SL) cascade model provides a plausible
characterization of how these two cascades intertwine. However, without the two
channels of indirect contagion, namely asset fire sales and bank panics, insolvency
and illiquidity are nearly independent in the sense that the cash buffer is unaffected
by the solvency step and the equity buffer is unaffected by the liquidation step. Since
such independence is implausible in reality, only the Extended SL cascade model that
incorporates two channels of indirect contagion meets our criteria for a comprehensive
cascade model of systemic risk that fully addresses spillovers between insolvency and
illiquidity. In fact, one can argue that a model that does not at least address all the
contagious flows shown in Figure 1 cannot be taken as a comprehensive systemic risk
model.
The particular way indirect contagion is included in the ESL cascade model makes
additional simplifying assumptions whose implications are important to understand.
First, the asset fire sale mechanism is based on banks holding a single common external
fixed asset. In other words, their investment portfolios are assumed to be 100%
correlated. The reality is that in most countries, bank portfolios are indeed highly,
but not perfectly correlated. Since we expect systemic risk to be increasing with
portfolio homogeneity, the common asset assumption is a prudent (i.e. pessimistic)
assumption. It is also parsimonious: accounting for multiple asset types along the lines
of [Caccioli et al., 2014] will add a considerable layer of complexity to the ESL cascade
model. Analogously, we have treated external depositors as a single homogeneous
pool that relies on system-wide indicators of systemic risk and is not able to spot
individual weak banks. Consequently, at times of crisis they withdraw funding from
the system en masse, causing bank panics but not bank runs. Again, a more realistic
model will follow [Rochet and Vives, 2004] and disaggregate the deposit pool, and
enable depositors of weak banks to run more strongly than depositors of strong banks.
However, we expect systemic risk to be increasing in depositor homogeneity, so our
single pool assumption is again both prudent and parsimonious.
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Another reason to take the ESL cascade model seriously is that it has a rich
family of parameters that can be adjusted to focus on the various contagion channels
separately or in combination. For example, setting the parameters α, β, β′ all zero
turns off the fire sale effect, allowing one to test the significance of this channel in
propagating contagion. Moreover, having the full range of parameters of the ESL
cascade model to work with should enable one to mimic most of the existing contagion
models identified in the literature review in the introduction, to compare the explicit
and hidden assumptions they make, and to test whether or not they omit significant
features.
Any comprehensive systemic risk model that accounts for all the flows identified
in Figure 1 will be at least as complicated as the ESL cascade model, and will be
based on a large number of behavioural assumptions, many of which will likely be
ad hoc rather than microfounded. The ESL cascade model relies on Asset-Liability
symmetry to reduce the number and complexity of assumptions needed, and appeals
to Occam’s Razor for its justification. While there are good reasons to be skeptical
of AL symmetry in the real world, there are also good reasons not to abandon it as
a tool in systemic risk modelling. There is insight gained in realizing that a mark-to-
market decrease in fixed asset valuations is the AL dual to a new debt withdrawal,
and that similarly, a new loan added to the books that depletes the cash buffer is
the AL counterpart to a mark-to-market increase in the value of debt that depletes
the equity buffer. While we may fail to see the AL symmetry at the level of houses
(banks), it becomes clearer at the level of the village (the entire network).
Ultimately, the ESL cascade model is intended as a provisional, consistent frame-
work for financial systemic risk comprehensive enough to include all the spillover
effects identified by the arrows shown in Figure 1. Exploring some of its implications
through simulation experiments based on real-world financial networks will be the
subject of a subsequent paper. This model can also be seen as a logical platform upon
which successive layers of future improvements can be built. Questions of which are
the most important effects missing from the ESL cascade model, how to model them,
and how they change the stability of the system, are a rich source of topics to be
investigated in future work.
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